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 Banking and financial regulation—which I’ll hereafter refer to simply as financial 
regulation—is needed because the financial system provides functions that are essential 
to economic development. The principal function is the aggregation of moneys and the 
allocation thereof for productive projects. Although each nation regulates banking and 
finance in its own ways, the universal nature of finance drives a natural convergence in 
the nature of financial regulation. This chapter thus focuses on the universal principles of 
financial regulation. 
 
 A. Banking 
 
 Traditionally, financial regulation focused on banking because banks historically 
have been the primary entities that have aggregated moneys—primarily by taking 
deposits from customers—and then allocated such monies—primarily by making loans—
to borrowers to invest in productive projects, such as factories. Traditional financial 
regulation therefore is geared to ensuring that deposit-taking banks can continue to 
perform these functions efficiently.  
 
 B. Shadow Banking 
 
 In recent years, non-banks have increasingly begun replacing 
(“disintermediating”) traditional banks as the intermediaries of funds—that is, the entities 
that aggregate moneys and then allocate such monies to firms to invest in productive 
projects. Shadow banking is a loose term that refers to this process of disintermediation.2 
The size of the shadow-banking sector—which includes securitization, money-market 
mutual funds, hedge funds, securities lending, asset-backed commercial paper (“ABCP”) 
                                                 
2 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Shadow Banking, 31 REVIEW OF BANKING & 
FINANCIAL LAW 619 (2012-13). 
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conduits, structured investment vehicles (“SIVs”), and repo financing—was estimated at 
$60 trillion worldwide in December 2011.3 More recent estimates suggest an even higher 
number.4  
 
 Several reasons, including efficiency and regulatory arbitrage, account for the 
rapid rise of shadow banking. Shadow banking can be efficient because disintermediation 
removes traditional banks as the “middleman” of funding, thereby avoiding the profit 
mark-up that banks charge on their loans. Furthermore, in markets where traditional 
banks cannot flexibly operate due to overly restrictive regulation, shadow banks can help 
to fund unmet demands.5 The response to Regulation Q in the United States is but one 
example of this. Regulation Q imposed limits on the interest rates that banks could pay to 
depositors, creating an unmet demand—especially by institutional depositors—for higher 
returns. That demand sparked the rise of money-market mutual funds, which offered 
much higher rates of return than bank deposits.6  
                                                 
3 Philipp Halstrick, Tighter Bank Rules Give Fillip to Shadow Banks, REUTERS (Dec. 20, 
2011, 4:17 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/20/ uk-regulation-shadow-
banking-idUSLNE7BJ00T20111220 (last visited June 10, 2013). 
4 See FIN. STABILITY BD., GLOBAL SHADOW BANKING MONITORING REPORT (2012), 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_121118c.pdf (estimating shadow 
banking’s worldwide assets as $67 trillion in 2011). Cf. Sheridan Prasso, Shadow 
Banking, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 16, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/shadow-
banking/ (reporting that the Financial Stability Board believes that shadow banking grew 
by $5 trillion in 2012 to $71 trillion). 
5 Timothy Lane, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Canada, “Shedding Light on Shadow 
Banking,” Speech to the CFA Society (June 26, 2013), available at 
http://www.bis.org/review/r130628g.pdf. 
6 Jonathan Macey, Reducing Systemic Risk: The Role of Money Market Mutual Funds as 
Substitutes for Federally Insured Bank Deposits, 17 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 131, 138 
(2011). Sometimes, however, shadow banking can result from pure regulatory arbitrage, 
without efficiency considerations. For example, in the context of mortgage lending, bank 
holding companies (BHCs) can lend through affiliated depository institutions (ADIs) or 
affiliated mortgage companies (AMCs). Whereas ADIs are chartered and subject to 
banking regulations, including capital requirements, underwriting requirements, and strict 
accounting practices, AMCs are not subject to any such regulation. Yuliya Demyanyk & 
Elena Loutskina, Mortgage Companies and Regulatory Arbitrage 2 (Fed. Res. Bank of 
Cleveland, Working Paper No. 12-20R 2014), available at 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/2012/wp1220r.pdf. By using an AMC 
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 Regardless of the reasons for the rise of shadow banking, the failure of financial 
regulation to adequately address that rise “is widely believed to have contributed to the 
buildup of risks in the financial system in the period leading up to” the 2008 global 
financial crisis (the “financial crisis”).7 Financial regulation must also focus on shadow 
banking.  
 
 C. Some Fundamentals 
 
 Actual financial regulation tends to be imperfect. Policymakers and regulators 
tend to respond to the media, which can create distortions by emphasizing what 
journalists find accessible. Furthermore, after a financial crisis, people naturally want to 
prevent the next crisis. Regulators, who are themselves usually subject to political short-
termism, typically respond by focusing on preventative regulation, or at least regulation 
aimed at preventing the next financial meltdown. But that focus is insufficient because it 
is impossible to always predict the cause of the next financial crisis. 
 
Moreover, financial regulation is often tethered to the financial architecture—the 
particular design and structure of financial firms, markets, and other related institutions—
at the time the regulation is promulgated. Ongoing monitoring and updating of that 
regulation can be costly, however, and is subject to political interference at each updating 
stage.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
instead of an ADI, BHCs can avoid regulation and can engage in riskier lending 
practices. Id. 
7 Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can Address the 
Inevitability of Financial Failure, 92 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 75, 85 (2013). See also Ben S. 
Bernanke, Chairman, Speech at the Russell Sage Foundation and The Century 
Foundation Conference on Rethinking Finance (April 13, 2012), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20120413a.htm (arguing that 
mortgage lending through AMCs, discussed supra note 6, encouraged risky lending 
practices that contributed to the financial crisis). 
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Notwithstanding these distortions, financial regulation gets enacted. In discussing 
such regulation, it is useful to distinguish what economists sometimes call 
microprudential and macroprudential regulation. Financial regulation of the components 
of the financial system—fundamentally firms and markets—to ensure that they can 
efficiently perform their underlying economic functions is called microprudential 
regulation. Financial regulation of the financial system’s ability to function as a network 
within which its components can operate is called macroprudential regulation, and thus 
the goal of macroprudential regulation is to prevent “systemic” risk. As will be discussed, 
there is some overlap in these terms.   
  
II. MICROPRUDENTIAL REGULATION 
 
 As mentioned, microprudential regulation focuses on ensuring that firms and 
markets, the components of the financial system, can efficiently perform their underlying 
economic functions. In general, firms and markets operate efficiently absent “market” 
failures; hence the goal of microprudential financial regulation is to correct market 
failures. 
 
 A. Correcting Market Failures 
 
 1. Information Failure. A key market failure is information failure, which can 
undermine the reliability of pricing. Funding depends on reliable pricing. Regulation 
could therefore improve funding by correcting this market failure.  
 
The principal information failure is information asymmetry, referring to parties to 
a transaction having different amounts of relevant information. For example, an issuer of 
financial securities usually has more (and better) information than investors in the 
securities about the risks.  
 
Increasing financial complexity is exacerbating this failure, by undermining 
disclosure, which since the securities laws of the 1930s has been the chief regulatory tool 
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to reduce information asymmetry. Securities laws generally rely on disclosure, but some 
financial structures are getting so complex that they are effectively incomprehensible. It 
may even be rational sometimes for an investor to invest in high-yield complex securities 
without fully understanding them. There may be many reasons for this. For example, the 
investor simply may not have the staffing to evaluate the securities, whereas failure in 
invest would appear to—and in fact could—competitively prejudice the investor vis-à-vis 
others who invest.8 Thus, many institutional investors—including even the largest, most 
sophisticated, firms—bought complex mortgage-backed securities prior to the financial 
crisis without fully understanding them.9  
 
Financial complexity is inevitable. Profit opportunities are inherent in complexity, 
due in part to investor demand for securities that more precisely match their risk and 
reward preferences. Regulatory arbitrage increases complexity as market participants take 
advantage of inconsistent regulatory regimes both within and across national borders. 
And new technologies continue to add complexity not only to financial products but also 
to financial markets. Complexity may well be the greatest future challenge for financial 
regulation.  
 
2. Rationality Failure. Another market failure is rationality failure, which can also 
undermine the reliability of pricing. Even in financial markets, humans have bounded 
rationality. In areas of complexity, for example, we tend to overrely on heuristics—
broadly defined as simplifications of reality that allow us to make decisions in spite of 
our limited ability to process information. Modern finance has become so complex that 
the financial community routinely relies on heuristic-based customs, such as determining 
creditworthiness of securities by relying on formalistic credit ratings and assessing risk 
on financial products by relying on simplified mathematical models. Market participants 
also follow the herd in their investment choices and are prone to panic. Furthermore, they 
are unrealistically optimistic when thinking about extreme events with which they have 
                                                 
8 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Disclosure’s Failure in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2008 
UTAH LAW REVIEW 1109, 1113-15 (2008). 
9 Id. at 1110. 
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no recent experience, devaluing the likelihood and potential consequences of those 
events. Because human nature cannot be easily changed, there are limited regulatory 
solutions to the problem of rationality failure.  
 
3. Agency Failure. This market failure generally refers to the misalignment of the 
interests of principals and their agents. Scholars have long studied inefficiencies resulting 
from conflicts of interest between managers and owners of firms. There also is a much 
more insidious principal-agent failure: the intra-firm problem of secondary-management 
conflicts. The nub of the problem is that secondary managers are almost always paid 
under short-term compensation schemes, misaligning their interests with the long-term 
interests of the firm. Complexity exacerbates this problem by increasing information 
asymmetry between technically sophisticated secondary managers and the senior 
managers to whom they report.   
 
For example, with limited technical expertise and limited time available to devote 
to risk assessment, a firm’s senior managers often want risk to be modeled and reduced to 
useable numbers.10 Models, however, can be manipulated. For example, VaR, or value-
at-risk, has been the most widely used model for reducing investment risk to a number.11 
As the VaR model became more accepted, banks began compensating analysts not only 
for generating profits but also for generating profits with low risks, measured by VaR. 
Analysts therefore began to refocus investment portfolios to concentrate more on 
securities (such as mortgage-backed securities and credit-defaults swaps) that generate 
gains but only rarely have losses.12 Because the likelihood of these losses was less than 
                                                 
10 Joe Nocera, Risk Mismanagement, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2009, § 6 (Magazine), at 24. 
11 Id. at 26. 
12 Id. In a credit-default swap, one party (the credit “seller”) agrees, in exchange for the 
payment to it of a fee by a second party (the credit “buyer”), to assume the credit risk of 
certain debt obligations of a specified borrower or other obligor. If a “credit event” (for 
example, default or bankruptcy) occurs in respect of that obligor, the credit seller will 
either (a) pay the credit buyer an amount calculated by reference to post-default value of 
the debt obligations or (b) buy the debt obligations (or other eligible debt obligations of 
the obligor) for their full face value from the credit buyer. See Steven L. Schwarcz, 
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the risk percentages taken into account under VaR modeling—which typically excludes 
losses that have less than a one-percent (or, in some cases, five-percent) likelihood of 
occurring within the model’s limited time frame—such losses were not included in the 
VaR computations.13 Analysts knew but did not always make clear to senior management 
that in the rare cases where such losses occurred, they would be huge.14 
 
In theory, firms can solve this principal-agent failure by paying managers, 
including secondary managers, under longer-term compensation schemes—e.g., 
compensation subject to clawbacks or deferred compensation based on long-term results. 
In practice, however, that solution would confront a collective action problem: firms that 
offer their secondary managers longer-term compensation might not be able to hire as 
competitively as firms that offer more immediate compensation.  
 
Regulation can solve the collective action problem, and thus correct the principal-
agent failure, by requiring financial firms—or at least those that meet relevant criteria of 
materiality—to pay managers, including secondary managers, under longer-term 
compensation schemes. However, because good secondary managers can work in 
financial centers worldwide, international regulation may be needed to help fully solve 
the collective action problem. 
 
4. Risk Marginalization.  Risk dispersion is intended to reduce risk from the 
standpoint of any given investor through investment diversification and more efficient 
allocation of risk. But if risk is spread too widely, it can become marginalized such that 
rational market participants individually lack the incentive to monitor it and important 
correlations between risks can be obscured.15 Furthermore, because the human brain’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 
211, 235 n. 131 (2009/2010). 
13 Nocera, supra note 10, at 46. 
14 Id. 
15 Steven L. Schwarcz, Marginalizing Risk, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 487 (2012). 
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ability to accurately correlate perceived and actual risk is limited,16 we tend to ignore or 
undervalue risk below a minimum threshold level.17 For these and other reasons, 
investors and other market participants sometimes underestimate and under-protect 
against risk, with few worrying about where dispersed risk goes or whether risk 
dispersion can impact the stability of financial markets.18  
 
Marginalization of risk can have both microprudential and macroprudential 
consequences. The first—which is the subject of this Part II—occurs when the 
marginalization harms only the market participants (and their investors) that 
underestimate and under-protect against the risk. The second—which is the subject of 
Part III below (discussing macroprudential regulation)—occurs when the marginalization 
also harms the financial system itself, as happened in the financial crisis.19  
 
Macroprudential consequences are especially likely to occur when 
marginalization of risk is coupled with collective action problems. For example, the 
benefits of exploiting finite capital resources might accrue to individual market 
participants, each of whom is motivated to maximize use of the resources, whereas the 
costs of exploitation may be distributed more widely.20 Absent regulatory intervention, 
market participants will individually pursue their self-interests to the detriment of other 
market participants (not to mention the financial system and the real economy).21 
Moreover, market participants—especially those who are investors—may act as free 
                                                 
16 See, e.g., Paul Slovic et al., Risk As Analysis and Risk As Feelings: Some Thoughts 
About Affect, Reason, Risk, and Rationality, 24 RISK ANALYSIS 311, 315 (2004). 
17  See, e.g., Richard J. Herring et al., Wharton Fin. Inst. Ctr. and Oliver Wyman Inst. 
12th Annual Fin. Risk Roundtable 2009: The New Role of Risk Management: Rebuilding 
the Model (June 24, 2009), available at 
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2268. Cf. WILLIAM J. 
RAPAPORT ET AL., LANGUAGE AND MEANING IN COGNITIVE SCIENCE: COGNITIVE ISSUES 
AND SEMANTIC THEORY 85 (Josefa Toribio & Andy Clark eds., 1998) (observing the 
human tendency to ignore details when overwhelmed by complexity). 
18 Marginalizing Risk, supra note 15. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id.  
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riders, assuming that other investors have more significant amounts at stake and therefore 
must be engaging in due diligence and monitoring.22  
 
Regulating risk dispersion that causes only microprudential consequences would 
likely be inefficient because market participants themselves should want to protect 
against those consequences. But regulating risk dispersion that causes macroprudential 
consequences could well be appropriate, and indeed, parallels the traditional regulatory 
focus of government.23  
 
B. Broader Regulatory Approaches.  
 
The discussion so far has addressed how microprudential regulation can mitigate 
market failures. Microprudential regulation can also address market failures more broadly 
by ensuring that firms can resist the adverse impact of market failures.  
 
1. Capital Requirements. The most common way that regulation accomplishes this 
is by imposing “capital” requirements, which are intended to protect financial institutions 
against unexpected losses. Capital requirements in their modern form—based on ratios 
                                                 
22 Id. Cf. GORDON DE BROUWER, HEDGE FUNDS IN EMERGING MARKETS 150 (2001) 
(noting that “even rational market participants may at times ignore their own private 
information and follow the actions of earlier participants because the [perceived] 
information in other people’s collective actions overwhelms the individual’s private 
information.”). More crassly, an investor may rationalize that it will be in no worse 
position than its competitors, who are making these same kinds of investments, if the 
investment fails—especially given the investment’s relatively small size. Even if that 
rationalization is justified at the outset, however, continuing competitive pressures may 
motivate the investor to increase the investment, especially where approval of the initial 
investment sets an institutional precedent that makes further approvals easier. 
Marginalizing Risk, supra note 15.  
23 For a discussion of how to design that regulation, see id. (arguing that although 
regulatory responses may be second best, imperfect regulation may well be preferable to 
limiting risk dispersion because the latter could inadvertently increase the potential for 
regulatory arbitrage, increase financial instability, and impair the ability of parties to 
achieve negotiated market efficiencies).  
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rather than fixed dollar amounts—were introduced into banking regulation in the 1980s.24 
In that form, the requirements are expressed as capital-adequacy ratios: the minimum 
ratio of equity (including equity-like securities) that a bank must hold as a percentage of 
risk-weighted assets.  
 
The imposition of capital requirements at the national level created a collective 
action problem: banks subject to those requirements might become less competitive, at 
least from a cost standpoint, than banks in nations that did not impose such requirements 
(or that imposed less strict requirements). In response, bank regulators around the world 
began to work together, through the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(hereinafter, “BCBS”),25 to try to develop uniform capital requirements.26   
 
In 1988, the BCBS released the Basel Capital Accord (hereinafter, “Basel I”), 
which set minimum capital-adequacy ratios for international banks in countries enacting 
Basel I into law. Over 100 countries enacted Basel I or at least principles based on Basel 
I.27  
 
Basel I took a two-tiered approach to defining “capital.” Tier 1 capital included 
widely recognized forms of equity, such as shareholder’s equity and retained earnings. 
Tier 2 included more controversial forms of equity, such as undisclosed reserves, asset-
revaluation reserves, general loan-loss reserves, subordinated debt, and certain hybrid 
                                                 
24 Douglas J. Elliott, Greg Feldberg, & Andreas Lehnert, The History of Cyclical 
Macroprudential Policy in the United States, Fed. Reserve Bd., Finance and Economics 
Discussion Series No. 2013-29, at 34 (2013) (discussing how bank regulators switched 
from using capital requirements based on fixed dollar amounts to capital requirements 
based on the ratio of capital to total assets, and how the Basel I Accord spread that latter 
regulatory approach internationally). 
25 Established in 1974 by the central bank governors of the Group of Ten, the BCBS 
“provides a forum for regular cooperation on banking supervisory matters” and its 
objective is to “enhance understanding of key supervisory issues and improve the quality 
of banking supervision worldwide.” The BCBS has no formal authority; it leaves the 
implementation of recommendations to individual countries. See Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/ (last visited July 22, 2014).  
26 DANIEL K. TARULLO, BANKING ON BASEL 29 & 45 (2008). 
27 Id. at 64-65. 
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(debt/equity) capital instruments. Basel I required internationally active banks to maintain 
“total” capital—restricted to Tier 1 capital and a potentially discounted amount of Tier 2 
capital28—equal to at least 8% of their risk-weighted assets. Assets—which in the case of 
banks are primarily loans payable to the banks—were risk-weighted according to five 
categories, depending on the generic type of the asset (and not, for example, the 
particular creditworthiness the borrower on a loan).29  
 
Less than ten years after the release of Basel I, the BCBS began rethinking how to 
improve capital-adequacy ratios. Basel I’s weaknesses included the bluntness of its risk-
weighting of assets and its exclusive focus on credit risk.30 Experience also showed that 
Basel I encouraged regulatory arbitrage, such as banks engaging in securitization 
transactions instead of making loans.31 The result was the release in 2004 of the Revised 
Basel Capital Accord (hereinafter, “Basel II”).  
 
Basel II retained some elements of Basel I, including the definition of capital and 
the 8% requirement. However, it took a broader view of risk, including not only credit 
risk (the risk that a borrower will not repay its loan) but also market risk (the risk that the 
market value of an asset will decline) and operational risk (the “risk of loss resulting from 
inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events”).32 
Further, Basel II introduced a three-pillar regulatory structure, explained below, based on 
(1) minimum capital requirements, (2) supervisory review, and (3) market discipline.  
                                                 
28 The amount of Tier 2 capital included in total capital could not exceed the amount of 
Tier 1 capital.  
29 TARULLO, supra note 26, at 57. 
30 Market risk was included in Basel I, however, under the 1996 Market Risk 
Amendment. Id. at 61. 
31 Capital Standards for Banks: The Evolving Basel Accord, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF 
THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 396 (Sept. 2003),  
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2003/0903lead.pdf. 
32 Consultative Document Operational Risk, BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING 
SUPERVISION, CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT OPERATIONAL RISK 2 (2001), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca07.pdf. The goal of incorporating operational risk into the 
capital requirements was to reward banks with sophisticated risk management systems. 
Id. at 1-2.   
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The first pillar—minimum capital requirements—addressed credit, market, and 
operational risk. Banks had to take all of these risks into account when calculating their 
minimum capital requirement. Unlike Basel I, however, Basel II gave banks the option of 
assessing credit risks through one of two internal ratings-based procedures or under a 
standardized approach using external credit rating agencies.33 The second pillar—
supervisory review—set forth guidelines for how banks should engage in risk assessment, 
emphasizing monitoring, early intervention, and prompt remedial action to prevent the 
capital-adequacy ratio from slipping below the 8% minimum.34 The third pillar—market 
discipline—focused on requiring banks to formally disclose their risks to the 
marketplace, thereby providing other banks and market participants with information 
needed to negotiate contract terms that, effectively, should reward healthy banks and 
penalize risky banks.35 
 
Basel II was “available for implementation” at the end of 2007, but countries’ 
implementation timelines varied widely. The European Union fully implemented Basel II 
within a year, whereas Botswana and Gambia planned on full implementation by 2015.36 
The financial crisis, however, soon highlighted the need for capital-adequacy ratios that 
are less vulnerable to human error and bias.37 The result is Basel III,38 which has been 
                                                 
33 TARULLO, supra note 26, at 124-25. Banks could use three different methods to 
calculate operational risk: the basic indicator approach, the standardized approach, and 
the advanced/internal measurement approach. Market risk should be determined by the 
value at risk approach. 
34 GEOFFREY P. MILLER & FABRIZIO CAFAGGI, THE GOVERNANCE AND REGULATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 175-76 (2013). 
35 Pillar 3 disclosure requirements for remuneration, BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING 
SUPERVISION 1, (July 2011), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs197.pdf. 
36 TARULLO, supra note 26, at 126-27; Basel II, 2.5, and III Implementation, FINANCIAL 
STABILITY INSTITUTE 4 & 8 (July 2012), http://www.bis.org/fsi/fsiop2012.pdf. 
37 MILLER & CAFAGGI, supra note 34, at 180-81. 
38 “Basel III” collectively refers to “Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more 
resilient banks and banking systems,” “Basel III: International framework for liquidity 
risk measurement, standards and monitoring,” and “Annex: Minimum requirements to 
ensure loss absorbency at the point of non-viability.” See Basel III: A global regulatory 
framework for more resilient banks and banking systems, BASEL COMMITTEE ON 
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agreed to by members of the BCBS but is not slated for full implementation until January 
2019.39  
 
Basel III reforms Basel II,40 including by improving the inputs for banks’ internal 
ratings-based (sometimes called “IRB”) risk-assessment approaches. Basel III also more 
strictly defines what is included in Tier I capital41 and sets a minimum capital-adequacy 
requirement for Tier 1 capital itself (in addition to the minimum capital-adequacy 
requirement for total capital).42 Basel III also introduces greater disclosure requirements, 
a liquidity requirement, a leverage requirement, and two buffers—a 2.5% capital 
conservation buffer and a countercyclical capital buffer. The capital conservation buffer 
                                                                                                                                                 
BANKING SUPERVISION (Dec. 2010), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189_dec2010.pdf 
[hereinafter, Basel III: A global regulatory framework]; Basel III: International 
framework for liquidity risk measurement, standards and monitoring, BASEL COMMITTEE 
ON BANKING SUPERVISION (Dec, 2010), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs188.pdf; Annex: 
Minimum requirements to ensure loss absorbency at the point of non-viability, BASEL 
COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION (Jan. 2011), 
http://www.bis.org/press/p110113.pdf. 
39 The European Union and the United States enacted final sets of Basel III regulations in 
June and July of 2013. According to an August 2013 BCBS report, “internationally active 
banks continue to build capital, and appear well placed to meet the full set of fully 
phased-in minimum Basel III capital requirements ahead of the 2019 deadline.” Report to 
G20 Leaders on monitoring implementation of Basel III regulatory reforms, BASEL 
COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION 1 (Aug. 2013), 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs260.pdf.   
40 Basel III modifies and builds on existing Basel capital accords, including Basel II. 
International regulatory framework for banks (Basel III), BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm (last visited Aug. 3, 2014). 
41 “The concept of Tier 1 that we are familiar with will continue to exist and will include 
common equity and other instruments that have a loss-absorbing capacity on a “going 
concern” basis, for example certain preference shares. Innovative capital instruments 
which were permitted in limited amount as part of Tier 1 capital will no longer be 
permitted and those currently in existence will be phased out.” Hervé Hannoun, Gen. 
Manager, Bank for Int’l Settlements, The Basel III Capital Framework: a decisive 
breakthrough, BoJ-BIS High Level Seminar on Financial Regulatory Reform: 
Implications for Asia and the Pacific Hong Kong SAR (Nov. 22, 2010), available at 
http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp101125a.pdf. 
42 The total capital minimum remains at 8%, but Basel III requires that “Common Equity 
Tier 1 must be at least 4.5% of risk-weighted assets at all times” and that “Tier 1 Capital 
must be at least 6.0% of risk-weighted assets at all times.” Basel III: A global regulatory 
framework, supra note 38 at para. 49.  
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is mandatory, intended to ensure that banks build up capital reserves that can be drawn 
down in periods of stress to avoid breaches of the capital requirement minimum.43 The 
countercyclical capital buffer is discretionary, allowing national regulators to require 
banks to maintain an additional 2.5% of capital during periods of high credit growth.44 
 
As traditional bank lending contracted during the financial crisis, shadow banking 
expanded and filled part of the vacuum.45 In response, Basel III also imposes capital 
requirements on some shadow-banking activities. For example, it extends capital 
requirements to certain commitments to provide credit (loss protection) or liquidity 
(protection on the timing of payments, where ultimate losses are not expected). It also 
imposes capital requirements on short-term off-balance sheet commitments.46 
 
 2. Ring-Fencing. Another broad regulatory approach is ring-fencing, which can be 
understood as legally deconstructing a firm in order to more optimally reallocate and 
reduce risk.47 The deconstruction can occur in various ways: by separating risky assets 
from the firm; by preventing the firm itself from engaging in risky activities or investing 
in risky assets; or by protecting the firm from affiliate and bankruptcy risks.   
 
                                                 
43 Basel III: A global regulatory framework, supra note 38, at para. 122. 
44 Id. at para. 18-22. 
45 See supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text (discussing shadow banking). 
46 Daniel K. Tarullo, Governor, Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Speech at the 
Americans for Financial Reform and Economic Policy Institute Conference, Nov. 22, 
2013, available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20131122a.htm. In the United 
States, the Dodd-Frank Act imposes additional possible capital requirements. Section 171 
of that Act, for example, requires regulators to establish minimum leverage and risk-
based capital requirements for “banks, bank holding companies, and nonbank financial 
firms identified by the [Financial Stability Oversight Council] for enhanced Fed 
supervision.” James M. Pappenfus, Dodd-Frank and Basel III’s knowledge problem, 36 
HOUSE J. INT’L L. 253, 262 (2014) (emphasis added). See also Regulatory Capital Rules: 
Regulatory Capital, Implementation of Basel III, Minimum Regulatory Capital Ratios, 
Capital Adequacy, Transition Provisions, and Prompt Corrective Action, 77 Fed. Reg. 
52,791 (proposed Aug. 30, 2012) (to be codified in scattered parts of 12 C.F.R.). 
47 Steven L. Schwarcz, Ring-Fencing, 87 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 69 
(2013). 
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 Two forms of ring-fencing are commonly used for banks. One is to protect a bank 
from being taken advantage of by its affiliated firms—essentially preserving the business 
and assets of the ring-fenced bank. Regulation may require, for example, that transactions 
between a bank and its affiliates be arm’s length. This is exemplified by Section 23A of 
the U.S. Federal Reserve Act and by the recommendations of the report of the UK 
Independent Commission on Banking (often called the “Vickers Report”).48  The Vickers 
Report recommends, for example, that interactions by UK retail banks with their affiliates 
must be at arm’s length.49  
 
 Ring-fencing is also commonly used to limit a bank’s risky activities and 
investments. This use of ring-fencing had been the focus of the Glass-Steagall Act in the 
United States,50 and is currently exemplified by the Volcker Rule,51 as well as by the UK 
Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act of 2013 and the Liikanen Report.52 The 
Volcker Rule, for example, limits proprietary trading by banks, which was thought to be 
                                                 
48 INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON BANKING, FINAL REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS (2011) 
(often called the “Vickers Report” after Sir John Vickers, the Commission’s chair). 
49 Id. at 12. 
50 The Glass-Steagall Act ring-fenced deposit-taking banks by prohibiting them from 
engaging in the securities business, which was perceived as risky. The Glass-Steagall 
Act’s ring-fencing was repealed in November 12, 1999 by the passage of the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act of 1999. Ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 12 U.S.C.). Glass-Steagall refers to sections 16, 20, 21, and 32 of the Banking 
Act of 1933. Section 16 was codified as 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh). Section 20 was 
codified as 12 U.S.C. §377. Section 21 was codified as 12 U.S.C. §378(a)(1). Section 32 
was codified as 12 U.S.C. § 78. Repealed by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, the Financial 
Services Modernization Act of 1999, (Pub. L. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338, enacted Nov. 12, 
1999), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-106publ102/html/PLAW-
106publ102.htm. 
51 This rule is named after former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker – often cited 
as its principal designer. It is being codified pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. 
§§  619 & 1851.  
52 The “Liikanen Report” was promulgated by a European Commission-appointed panel 
of experts, chaired by Bank of Finland governor Erkki Liikanen. Although the Liikanen 
Report does not refer to ring-fencing directly, it recommends that banks separate certain 
of their risky activities from deposit-taking. Final Report of the High-level Expert Group 
on Reforming the Structure of the EU Banking Sector, chaired by Erkki Liikanen (Oct. 2, 
2012). 
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a cause contributing to the financial crisis.53 As codified, proprietary trading is defined as 
“engaging as a principal for the trading account of [a bank] in any transaction to purchase 
or sell, or otherwise acquire or dispose of, any security, any derivative, any contract of 
sale of a commodity for future delivery, any option on any such … [aforementioned] 
financial instrument.”54 This definition, however, has been criticized as itself raising 
questions, and the Volcker Rule itself has been criticized as reducing the economic 
efficiency of banks that profited from proprietary trading.55  
 
 Another common use of ring-fencing is to protect a firm from becoming subject 
to liabilities and other risks associated with bankruptcy—usually called making the firm 
“bankruptcy remote.”56 Although this use of ring-fencing is standard for securitization 
and covered bond transactions, it is not typically used in banking.57 The reason is path 
                                                 
53 Section 4 of the UK Banking Reform Act similarly prohibits retail banks from “dealing 
in securities as a principal.” The United Kingdom is also considering imposing a ban on 
proprietary trading by affiliates of UK retail banks—presumably to make it less likely 
that such affiliates could fail, which might imperil the retail banks. See PARLIAMENTARY 
COMMISSION ON BANKING STANDARDS, PROPRIETARY TRADING, 2012-13, H.C. 1034, at 
15-19. 
54 12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(4).  
55 See, e.g., Charles Whitehead, The Volcker Rule And Evolving Financial Markets, 1 
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 39, 40 (2011). Other criticisms include the argument that the Volcker 
Rule is motivating proprietary traders to leave commercial banks for firms like hedge 
funds and investment banks. See, e.g., Deutsche Bank Loses Option Trader Saiers to 
Hedge Fund Alphabet Management, BLOOMBERG (July 15, 2010, 10:33 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-14/deutsche-bank-loses-option-trader-saiers-
to-hedge-fund-alphabet-management.html; Top JPMorgan Prop Trader Leaves To 
Launch Hedge Fund, FORBES (Feb., 15, 2013, 12:48 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/2013/02/15/top-jpmorgan-prop-trader-leaves-
to-launch-hedge-fund/. These firms are poorer at absorbing losses than commercial 
banks, which tend to have much larger equity cushions, thus shifting the risk of 
proprietary trading to a frailer part of the financial system.  
56 Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization and Structured Finance, ELSEVIER’S 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION 6 (2011). 
57 Ring-fencing can also be used to help ensure that a firm is able to operate on a 
standalone basis even if its affiliated firms fail, but this form of ring-fencing has limited 
application to financial regulation. It is more commonly used by utility companies that 
need to ensure the public’s uninterrupted access to an important public service. See Ring-
Fencing, supra note 47. 
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dependent: at least in the United States, banks have not historically been subject to 
bankruptcy law.58  
 
3. Monitoring Through Stress Testing. Another broader regulatory approach is 
stress testing, which is effectively a form of monitoring.59 Stress testing has long been 
used in diverse fields, including engineering and medicine, to gauge the stability of 
something through rigorous testing beyond normal operating conditions. In a banking 
context, stress testing examines how banks would be likely to fare under hypothetical 
negative economic conditions, including financial market crashes, high unemployment 
and high default rates, failures of other large financial institutions, and liquidity 
shortages.60 
 
Although some banks have earlier used stress testing in their internal risk 
management, it has been required since 1996 by an amendment to Basel I.61 Since the 
financial crisis, regulators have expanded the use of stress testing.62 In the United States, 
                                                 
58 See 11 U.S.C. § 109 (excluding deposit-taking banks and domestic insurance 
companies from federal bankruptcy law).  
59 See infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text. This contrasts with the other regulation 
discussed, which is intended to correct market failures. 
60 Robert Weber, A Theory for Deliberation-Oriented Stress Testing Regulation, 98 
MINN. L. REV. 2236, 2239 (2014). 
61 MARIO QUAGLIARIELLO, STRESS-TESTING THE BANKING SYSTEM: METHODOLOGIES 
AND APPLICATIONS 1 (2009); Amendment to the Capital Accord to incorporate market 
risks, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 42 (originally released Jan. 1996, last 
updated Nov. 2005), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs119.pdf. 
62 Notably, this was sparked by the 2009 stress tests performed by the U.S. Federal 
Reserve on nineteen of the country’s largest banks in an attempt to stave off future losses 
and ensure that those banks could continue lending despite the deepening recession. See 
Timothy Geithner, How We Tested the Big Banks, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2009, at A33, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/07/opinion/07geithner.html?_r=0 
(explaining the motivation of the stress testing program was to “help replace uncertainty 
with transparency” as well as outlining the stress testing process).  
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for example, the Dodd-Frank Act requires stress testing not only for banks but also for 
non-bank systematically important financial institutions.63    
 
Stress testing is a form of monitoring because it gauges the health of financial 
institutions but does not directly offer a remedy should those institutions that fail the test. 
In the event a bank fails a stress test, regulators must decide on the next steps. The 
European Central Bank, for example, has been conducting stress tests on EU banks; a 
bank that fails the test will have two weeks to submit its proposed corrective measures 
and capital plans.64 
 
III. MACROPRUDENTIAL REGULATION 
 
 Macroprudential regulation refers to financial regulation of the financial system’s 
ability to function as a network, within which firms and markets can operate. As 
discussed, its primary goal is to prevent systemic risk. Ideal macroprudential regulation 
would therefore act ex ante, limiting the triggers of systemic shocks.  
 
 A. Limiting the Triggers of Systemic Shocks. 
 
 1. Maturity Transformation. Several vulnerabilities of the financial system can 
trigger systemic shocks. The classic vulnerability is maturity transformation: the asset-
liability mismatch that results from the short-term funding of long-term projects. This 
mismatch creates a “liquidity default risk” that borrowers will be unable to repay their 
lenders. According to some scholars, illiquidity is the fundamental source of financial 
failure.  
                                                 
63 Weber, supra note 60, at 2292. Banks with more than $10 billion (previously the 
threshold was $50 billion) in assets are now required to have two stress tests performed 
annually, one done internally and one conducted by regulators. 
64 Jeff Black & Sonia Sirletti, ECB Plans to Limit Stress-Test Inputs in Bank Checks, 
BLOOMBERG (July 11, 2014, 11:09 AM),  
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-11/ecb-plans-to-limit-stress-test-inputs-in-
bank-checks.html (describing the European Central Bank’s plan to conduct stress tests of 
euro-area lenders).  
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A bank “run” is the typical (though far from the only) example of maturity 
transformation leading to a liquidity default. In a bank run, panicked depositors will 
collectively demand their money. If, as is usual, the long-term maturities of the bank’s 
assets cannot generate cash quickly enough to pay the current depositor demands, the 
bank will default. And if (again, as is usual) the defaulting bank is interconnected with 
other banks, the defaulting bank’s failure to pay its obligations to those other banks can, 
in turn, deprive those other banks of money to pay their creditors—with the chain 
spreading. Maturity transformation was also at the core of the financial crisis, such as the 
well-known shadow-banking example, discussed below, of money-market mutual funds 
that used short-term loans by investors, essentially withdrawable on demand, to fund 
long-term projects.   
 
In mid-September 2008, a money-market mutual fund in the United States “broke 
the buck” for the first time in fourteen years.65 This meant that the fund’s price per share, 
or net asset value (“NAV”), fell below $1.00—the point at which fund investors will 
begin losing money. Because shares in mutual funds were not then U.S. government 
insured,66 fund investors industrywide raced to try to withdraw their investments from 
any remaining short-term assets—the effective equivalent of a bank run—before other 
investors depleted those assets.67 To mitigate potential systemic consequences, the U.S. 
government stepped in to guarantee money-market mutual fund share prices, thereby 
calming investors and quelling the run.68 
                                                 
65 Christopher Condon, Reserve Primary Money Fund Falls Below $1 a Share, 
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 16, 2008, 9:41 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a5O2y1go1GRU. See 
supra note 4 and accompanying text for a discussion of money-market mutual funds. See 
also infra note 79 and accompanying text for discussion of proposed regulatory solutions.  
66 This contrasts with bank deposits, which are guaranteed up to specified limits by the 
U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 
67 Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher M. Gandia, Money Market Funds Run Risk: Will 
Floating Net Asset Value Fix the Problem?, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 313, 317 (2014) 
(also noting that the money-market mutual funds were unable to secure short-term credit 
to meet the sudden demand). 
68 Id. 
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Maturity transformation is thus a vulnerability of the financial system, but it is 
also a benefit. Using short-term debt to fund long-term projects is attractive because, if 
managed to avoid a default, it tends to lower the cost of borrowing. The interest rate on 
short-term debt is usually lower than that on long-term debt because, other things being 
equal, it is easier to assess a borrower’s ability to repay in the short term than in the long 
term, and long-term debt carries greater interest-rate risk.  
 
 Regulation should not, therefore, attempt to prohibit maturity transformation per 
se. In a banking context, for example, the standard regulatory solution is not to require 
banks to match-fund their assets. Rather, governments often provide deposit insurance 
that limits the likelihood that depositors will panic.69  
 
 In other contexts, however, maturity transformation may well remain a real 
vulnerability. Because many shadow-banking sources of funding, such as short-term 
commercial paper, are not payable on demand—and thus are not subject to the same type 
of “run” risk as traditional deposits—deposit insurance is not a solution. And other 
regulatory solutions are likely to be imperfect.70 Depending on how it is designed, 
regulation protecting the financial system against maturity-transformation risk can 
increase moral hazard, which in turn can motivate risky actions by shadow banks. For 
example, regulation that protects the shadow-bank issuer of short-term securities against 
its own risky actions would almost certainly increase moral hazard.  Regulation that 
limits incentives for shadow banks to engage in maturity transformation—such as 
imposing higher capital requirements on firms that engage in maturity transformation—
                                                 
69 See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.  
70 In the context of money-market mutual funds, for example, regulators have been 
debating potential reforms for years. In July 2014, the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) announced regulatory reforms to be implemented in two years, but 
the regulation remains controversial. See Sarah N. Lynch, SEC’s long path to money 
market fund reform ends in compromise, REUTERS (July 23, 2014, 5:16 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/23/us-sec-moneyfunds-
idUSKBN0FS08E20140723. See also supra notes 3, 6, & 65-68 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of money-market mutual funds and shadow banking. 
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would reduce moral hazard but would also reduce the economic efficiency achieved by 
maturity transformation.71  
 
 Thus, the liquidity default risk that inevitably remains can trigger systemic 
shocks. Indeed, the failure of pre-financial-crisis regulation to adequately address 
liquidity default risk resulting from shadow banking’s maturity transformation “is widely 
believed to have contributed to the buildup of risks in the financial system in the period 
leading up to” that crisis.72 
 
 2. Limited Liability. Another vulnerability is the financial system’s failure to 
require market participants to fully internalize their harm. As a result, they are 
economically motivated to engage in risky but profitable transactions because much of 
the harm from a possible systemic collapse would be externalized onto other market 
participants as well as onto ordinary citizens impacted by an economic collapse.  
 
 The most direct regulatory solution should therefore be to require market 
participants to internalize that harm. For various reasons, including the longstanding 
limited liability accorded corporate shareholders throughout the world, that may not be 
feasible. With the rise of shadow banking, limited liability is becoming especially 
problematic. For the small and decentralized firms (such as hedge funds) that dominate 
the shadow-banking sector, equity investors tend to be active managers. Limited liability 
gives these investor-managers strong incentives to take risks that could generate out-size 
personal profits, even if that greatly increases systemic risk. 
 
                                                 
71 A possible compromise might be regulation that protects not individual shadow banks 
but the overall markets for short-term securities, such as the Commercial Paper Funding 
Facility put into place by the U.S. Federal Reserve during the financial crisis to protect 
the commercial paper market. I later discuss this in Part III.C.2, infra. 
72 Regulating Ex Post, supra note 7, at 85. 
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 3. Other Vulnerabilities. The very nature of the financial system also subjects it to 
other systemic vulnerabilities that cannot be regulated away.73 Because the financial 
system exhibits the characteristics of—and effectively comprises—a high-risk system 
that is susceptible to “normal accidents,” regulators cannot predict, and therefore cannot 
eliminate, all the triggers of systemic shocks. Another reason why regulators cannot 
realistically eliminate all of the triggers of systemic shocks is that certain of the market 
failures that are the subject of imperfect microprudential regulation could even trigger 
systemic failures. For example, information failure, rationality failure, agency failure, and 
risk marginalization could, individually or in combination, cause one or more large 
financial firms to overinvest, leading to bankruptcy; and the bankruptcy of a large, 
interconnected financial firm could lead to a systemic collapse. It therefore is virtually 
certain that the financial system will face systemic shocks from time to time.  
 
B. Existing Macroprudential Regulatory Approaches.  
 
Since the financial crisis, policymakers and regulators generally recognize the 
need for macroprudential regulation. However, they tend to approach it as constituting a 
loose assortment of “tools” in their “toolkit.” The macroprudential ‘toolkit’ generally 
comprises cross-sectoral leverage ceilings, credit and credit-growth ceilings, reserve and 
capital buffer requirements, liquidity minima and maturity mismatch maxima, dynamic 
countercyclical provisioning, and surveillance and data collection.74 It is still unclear, 
though, which “tools” should be used in which circumstances, or as to how the tools 
should be calibrated. That itself creates risk because the misapplication of these tools—
such as imposing excessively restrictive leverage or credit and credit-growth ceilings—
may be as likely to cause financial problems as to solve them. 
 
                                                 
73 Cf. supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text (observing that marginalization of risk 
can also have macroprudential consequences, and that regulatory solutions are all second 
best). 
74 Robert Hockett, “Implementing Macroprudential Finance-Oversight Policy: Legal 
Considerations” 12-13 (Jan. 20, 2013 draft prepared for the International Monetary Fund; 
on file with author). 
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For example, because economic growth is strongly tied to the availability of 
credit,75 overly restrictive credit or credit-growth ceilings could cause the economy to 
contract. Yet the very justification for these ceilings—the “compelling evidence that 
credit booms tend to precede particularly severe and prolonged downturns”76—is 
questionable. Evidence of the mere tendency for credit booms to precede severe 
economic downturns does not prove a causal relationship. And even if that causal 
relationship were proved, the evidence does not yet appear to provide a clear basis for 
quantifying a limitation on credit growth. 
 
The misapplication of capital requirements could also backfire. The regulatory 
reform dialogue increasingly is focusing on a countercyclical and flexible approach to 
capital requirements.77 Finance, and especially banking, is by nature procyclical: the 
increased availability of capital stimulates economic growth.78 Historically, financial 
regulation has tended to be procyclical as well—loosening during booms and becoming 
stricter after crises.79 The rationale for countercyclical capital requirements is that they 
                                                 
75 See, e.g., GEORGE COOPER, THE ORIGIN OF FINANCIAL CRISES: CENTRAL BANKS, 
CREDIT BUBBLES, AND THE EFFICIENT MARKET 121 (2008).  
76 Elliott, Feldberg, & Lehnert, supra note 24, at 2 (observing this justification for the 
“growing support for the view that policymakers should use a variety of tools to 
minimize . . . excessive credit growth” that could fuel asset bubbles). They also observe, 
id., that some economists even conclude from this evidence that the “primary purpose” of 
macroprudential tools should be “controlling credit growth.”  
77 See Kristin N. Johnson, Macroprudential Regulation: A Sustainable Approach to 
Regulating Financial Markets, 2013 University of ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW 881, 916 (2013) 
(discussing flexible capital requirements as a macroprudential tool); Richard Berner, 
Director of Office of Financial Research, Remarks at the Joint Conference of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Cleveland and Office of Financial Research, Financial Stability 
Analysis: “Using the Tools, Finding the Data” (May 30, 2013) (identifying 
countercyclical capital requirements as a tool to reduce or neutralize “threats to financial 
stability”).  
78 Haocong Ren, Countercyclical Financial Regulation 3 (The World Bank, Working 
Paper No. 5823, 2011), available at http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-
9450-5823 (also observing that during economic booms and bubbles, credit expansion 
outpaces economic growth; and that during economic downturns, lending contracts, 
further worsening economic prospects). 
79 Brett H. McDonnell, Designing Countercyclical Capital Buffers, 18 N.C. BANKING 
INST. 123 (2013) (noting that the same factors that cause cycles in the financial markets, 
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would help to moderate economic growth, discouraging the buildup of imbalances during 
economic booms and bubbles (by reducing excessive risk-taking and credit expansion).80  
 
But countercyclical capital requirements are only as good as the accuracy of the 
indicators that determine their application and timing. Potential indicators include GDP 
growth, credit conditions, asset prices, banking performance and soundness indicators, 
leverage ratios, and credit and liquidity spreads.81 There has been debate, however, about 
whether countercyclical regulation is actually feasible given that it is virtually impossible 
to know ex ante whether a financial cycle is rational or merely a bubble.82 Furthermore, 
countercyclical regulation’s effectiveness could be undermined by regulatory arbitrage if 
the measures are not analogously applied to relevant shadow banking activities.83 
 
Accuracy is critical because the misapplication or mistiming of countercyclical 
regulation can have unintended adverse consequences, as illustrated by the notorious 
savings and loan (“S&L”) crisis of the 1980s in the United States. S&L institutions faced 
a period in which rising interest rates made lending less attractive to borrowers.84 To 
avoid having to commit government funds to bail out financially stressed institutions, 
regulators relieved the stress by engaging in a type of countercyclicality: they eased the 
capital ratios in order to “help banks muddle through [that] difficult period.”85 However, 
the result of that forbearance, in conjunction with other regulatory-relief steps, was to 
rapidly expand the size of the S&L industry—from $686 billion in 1982 to $1.1 trillion 
                                                                                                                                                 
cause financial regulations to reinforce the cycles). See also id. (discussing how capital 
requirements are procyclical when they force banks to cut back on lending due to 
faltering capital positions because of decreasing credit quality and increasing losses, 
further deteriorating economic performance and resulting in even more credit losses). 
80 Ren, supra note 78, at 4-5.  
81 Ren, supra note 78, at 6.  
82 Professor Patricia A. McCoy, Lecture on Countercyclical Regulation and its 
Challenges at the Centre for Commercial Law Studies (June 26, 2013) (arguing that even 
for real estate bubbles, no one has adequate information ex ante to know for sure whether 
the price increases are rationale or merely a bubble). 
83 Ren, supra note 78, at 8.  
84 Elliott, Feldberg, & Lehnert, supra note 24, at 34. 
85 Id. (observing that this countercyclicality was imprecisely implemented). 
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1985.86 When the S&L industry eventually collapsed, its increased size led to the largest 
federal bailout in U.S. history up to that time.87 
 
C. Alternative Macroprudential Regulatory Approaches.  
 
It therefore is clear that, notwithstanding the best efforts of regulators, the 
financial system will inevitably face systemic shocks. Accordingly, macroprudential 
regulation should also work ex post—after a systemic shock is triggered—to break the 
transmission of the shock and limit its impact. This approach accords with chaos theory, 
which addresses the problem of inevitable systemic shocks in complex engineering 
systems. The most successful (complex) systems are those in which the consequences of 
failures are limited. 
 
  1. Breaking the Transmission of Systemic Shocks. In examining how 
macroprudential regulation could break the transmission of systemic shocks and limit 
their impact, consider three factors that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
international Financial Stability Board (FSB) have identified as determinants of systemic 
risk: interconnectedness, size, and substitutability. In reality, these factors relate not to 
vulnerability but to the transmission of systemic shocks and their impact. These factors 
implicitly assume that the financial system is subject to vulnerabilities that could trigger 
systemic shocks.    
 
To break the transmission of systemic failures in the financial system would 
require that the transmission mechanisms all be identifiable. It is probably not feasible, 
however, to identify all those mechanisms in advance. Ring-fencing can be useful as a 
                                                 
86 Id. The eased capital ratios enabled rapid growth. For example, a $2 million dollar 
investment in a new S&L could be leveraged into $1.3 billion in assets. See 1 DIV. OF 
RESEARCH AND STATISTICS, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., HISTORY OF THE 80’S–LESSONS 
FOR THE FUTURE, 172-3 (1997), available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/index.html. 
87 See Lawrence A. Cunningham & David Zaring, Three or Four Approaches to 
Financial Regulation: A Cautionary Analysis Against Exuberance in Crisis Response, 78 
GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW 39, 51 (2009).  
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crude barrier, however.88 This is the primary regulatory approach taken in the United 
Kingdom, for example, to protect so-called retail banking, such as basic lending and 
deposit taking.89  
 
2. Stabilizing Systemically Important Firms and Markets. Because regulation 
cannot completely break the transmission of systemic shocks, regulators must also focus 
on trying to stabilize systemically important firms and financial markets impacted by the 
shocks. There are at least two ways that regulation could accomplish that: by requiring 
those firms and markets to be more internally robust, and/or by providing appropriate 
liquidity to those firms and markets. 
 
 Regulation could help to stabilize systemically important firms and markets by 
requiring them to be more internally robust. Financial regulation has long focused on 
requiring traditional deposit-taking banks to be robust, usually through capital and 
solvency requirements. Since the financial crisis, the United States, the European Union, 
and other jurisdictions are beginning to also subject “systemically important” non-bank 
financial firms (“SIFI”s) to a range of capital, solvency, and similar requirements.  
 
 This approach is imperfect, however, because it mixes the goals of 
macroprudential and microprudential regulation. The microprudential goal is to assure 
that individual firms can continue operating. By subjecting banks and SIFIs to rigorous 
capital, solvency, and similar requirements (to assure that they can continue operating), 
that microprudential goal inadvertently becomes a goal of the macroprudential regulation. 
The flaw in this mixed approach is that macroprudential regulation’s only goal should be 
to protect the financial system’s overall capacity to function as a network. 
Macroprudential regulation need not, therefore, impose capital or solvency requirements 
on individual firms—even those that are systemically important—so long as it otherwise 
                                                 
88 See supra notes 47-58 and accompanying text (discussing ring-fencing). 
89 See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
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achieves that goal. This regulatory flexibility is important because capital and solvency 
requirements do not always efficiently reduce systemic risk.90  
 
Other potential approaches to make systemically important firms more internally 
robust include requiring at least some portion of the firm’s debt to be in the form of so-
called contingent capital. Contingent capital debt would automatically convert to equity 
upon the occurrence of pre-agreed events.  
 
As a parallel to stabilizing systemically important firms by requiring them to be 
more internally robust, regulation could help to stabilize systemically important financial 
markets by requiring them also to be more internally robust. For example, increased 
speed in data transmission is generally associated with market efficiency, but the extreme 
speeds at which algorithmic trading takes place creates a danger of market collapse. In 
response, securities market regulators have been proposing the adoption of circuit-
breaker rules to at least temporarily halt trading under specified circumstances. 
 
Regulation could also help to stabilize systemically important firms and markets 
by providing appropriate liquidity. Liquidity has traditionally been used, especially by 
government central banks acting as lenders of last resort, to help prevent financial firms 
from defaulting. Ensuring liquidity to stabilize systemically important firms could follow 
this pattern, except that the source of the liquidity could at least be partly privatized by 
taxing those firms to create a systemic risk fund. 
                                                 
90 Regulating Financial Change, supra note 1. Cf. Katharina Pistor, “On the Theoretical 
Foundations for Regulating Financial Markets” 46 (June 2012 draft, available at 
http://works.bepress.com/katharina_pistor/11) (observing that “imposing capital or 
reserve requirements can push market participants to find ways [including the use of 
derivatives] to formally comply while making sure that their disposable assets are in fact 
not much curtailed,” thereby creating “additional sources of liquidity risk [that can] 
remain[] largely unrecognized by financial intermediaries and regulators alike”). This 
chapter does not address derivatives per se, because they will be addressed elsewhere in 
the Handbook. For a brief introduction to derivatives and financial regulation, see Steven 
L. Schwarcz, Derivatives and Collateral: Balancing Remedies and Systemic Risk, 
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW symposium issue (forthcoming 2014-15), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2419460.  
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Privatizing the source of liquidity would likewise help to internalize externalities, 
thereby not only offsetting the cost to taxpayers of liquidity advances that are not repaid 
but also, if structured appropriately, reducing moral hazard by discouraging fund 
contributors—including those that believe they are “too big to fail”—from engaging in 
financially risky activities.91  
 
Because financial markets can also be triggers and transmitters of systemic 
shocks, liquidity should be used to stabilize systemically important financial markets. For 
example, in response to the post-Lehman collapse of the commercial paper market, the 
U.S. Federal Reserve created the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (“CPFF”) to act as 
a lender of last resort for that market, with the goal of addressing “temporary liquidity 
distortions” by purchasing commercial paper from highly rated issuers that could not 




 Banking and financial regulation is needed to protect the financial system, which 
provides functions that are essential to economic development. Traditionally, financial 
regulation focused on banking because banks historically have aggregated moneys 
(primarily by taking deposits from customers) and then allocated those monies (by 
making loans to borrowers). Traditional financial regulation is geared to ensuring that 
deposit-taking banks can continue to perform these functions efficiently. In recent years, 
however, shadow banking has begun to overtake traditional banking. Financial regulation 
must therefore also address shadow banking. 
 
  Regardless of whether it addresses traditional or shadow banking, financial 
regulation has two overall goals: to ensure that the components of the financial system—
                                                 
91 For a thoughtful perspective on banks getting too big to manage, see Lawrence G. 
Baxter, Betting Big: Value, Caution and Accountability in an Era of Ultra 
Large Banking, 31 REV. BANK’G & FIN. L. 765, 879 (2012).  
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firms and markets—can efficiently perform their underlying economic functions, and to 
ensure the financial system’s ability to itself function as a network within which those 
components can operate. Regarding the first goal, firms and markets generally operate 
efficiently absent market failures. Financial regulation thus should help to correct those 
market failures—which include information and rationality failure, which can undermine 
the reliability of pricing, and agency failure in which conflicts can distort 
decisionmaking.   
 
 The other goal of financial regulation is to protect against the risk—usually called 
systemic risk—that the financial system will fail to function as a network within which 
firms and markets can operate. Although this regulation ideally would prevent systemic 
risk, several vulnerabilities of the financial system (such as maturity transformation and 
limited corporate liability) can trigger systemic shocks. It therefore is virtually certain, 
notwithstanding the best efforts of regulators, that the financial system will face systemic 
shocks from time to time. Accordingly, financial regulation should also be designed to 
work after systemic shocks are triggered, by breaking the transmission of the shocks and 
limiting their impact.  
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